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PRECEDENT IN LAw. Edited by Laurence Goldstein. New York: Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. xvi, 279. $42.
In Precedent in Law, Laurence Goldstein 1 has assembled a collection of essays dealing with the fundamental and pervasive phenomenon of precedent. 2 Although not formally divided into sections, the
essays fall into three basic categories: (1) essays providing an historical overview of the approaches to precedent; (2) essays concerning theories of binding precedent; and (3) essays on the less fundamental
(though still very important) issue of how one actually reasons from
prior cases, assuming that some version of the practice of precedent
can be justified.
Goldstein's purpose in bringing together the works of the eight
contributing scholars3 was "to produce a collection of essays that may
be read with pleasure and profit by students, practitioners and, indeed,
by anyone with an interest in the workings of the law" (p. vi). By thus
limiting his goals, Goldstein easily achieves them; yet he also limits
Precedent in Law's usefulness to the scholar. The essays focus on such
different areas and work from such varying assumptions that the
reader does not come away with any coherent sense of the role of precedent in legal theory. Although all of the essays address some aspect
of precedent, it is difficult to find a theme that unifies them. A summary of the three essays dealing with the theory of binding precedent
will illustrate this point.
In Theories ofAdjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis (pp. 7387), Peter Wesley-Smith addresses whether strict stare decisis can be
justified by either the declaratory or the positivist theory of decisionmaking. The declaratory theory views the common law as independent of the pronouncements of the judges: it is "unchanging and
unchangeable in essential content" (p. 79). Given that it is the judge's
duty to rule according to this eternal law and that previous judges may
have erred, precedents under the declaratory theory can never be
1. Reader in the Department of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong. Among Goldstein's
other works are Some Problems About Precedent, 43 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 88 (1984) and Four Alleged Paradoxes in Legal Reasoning, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313 (1979).
2. As usually formulated, the notion of precedent is that like cases should be treated alike.
3. The contributors are: Theodore M. Benditt, Professor of Philosophy and Dean of the
School of Humanities at the University of Alabama at Birmingham; Anthony Blackshield, Professor of Legal Studies at La Trobe University, Melbourne; Richard Bronaugh, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Western Ontario; Jim Evans, Senior Lecturer in Law at Auckland
University, New Zealand; Neil MacCormick, Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of
Nature and Nations, and Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Edinburgh; Michael S.
Moore, Robert Kingsley Professor of Law at the University of Southern California, and Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley; Gerald J. Postema, Associate Professor of
Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and Peter Wesley-Smith, Professor of Law at the University of Hong Kong. Pp. ix-x.
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strictly binding- they are good indicators of what the law is, but they
are not the law and hence cannot command blind adherence. 4 The
positivist theory, on the other hand, views judicial pronouncements as
law made by judges. This would, at first, seem to require that judgemade law be strictly followed; in fact, Wesley-Smith believes that the
positivist theory can support vertical stare decisis. 5 But what about
horizontal stare decisis? It would appear that if a court declares that
stare decisis is a rule of law, then subsequently that court is explicitly
bound to follow its own precedents (p. 85). However, Wesley-Smith
argues that "a court's authority to make law must be a continuing
authority, which would be denied if a court were bound by its own
decisions" (p. 82). He finds horizontal stare decisis as untenable as the
idea that Parliament could bind itself for the future. 6 To those who
would argue that law can derive from a legal system's "rule of recognition,"7 Wesley-Smith responds that such a rule is nothing more than
"the various criteria generally accepted as fundamental by the personnel of the legal system" (p. 86) and that the authority of stare decisis
(like any rule of law) becomes uncertain when the personnel no longer
agree that it is law. Thus, Wesley-Smith concludes, neither the positivist theory nor the declaratory theory can support the practice of
stare decisis.
Theodore M. Benditt, in The Rule ofPrecedent (pp. 89-106), examines the theoretical basis of precedent from a different angle, asking
how a rule of stare decisis can logically arise in the first place. After
first analyzing various justifications for stare decisis, 8 Benditt argues
4. P. 79. In another part of the essay, Wesley-Smith gives what might seem to be a different
account of the declaratory theory: "[T]he judge searches the records, discovers the law previ·
ously recognized, declares and expounds it, and applies it to the dispute before him." P. 74.
Although this statement suggests reliance on the rulings in previous cases rather than on the
judge's own determination of the law, it assumes that the law is "recognized" (i.e., discovered)
and not created.
5. Vertical stare decisis refers to "a court being bound by decisions of courts above it in the
hierarchy." P. 81. Horizontal stare decisis refers to a court being bound by its own earlier deci·
sions. See p. 82.
6. P. 82 n.46. But cf Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding
Precedent, in OXFORD EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 148, 154 (A. Guest ed. 1961).
7. P. 85; see, e.g., Simpson, supra note 6, at 154-55.
8. Benditt examines four such arguments. The first is that logical consistency demands that
later cases be treated like previous similar cases. Benditt dismisses this argument with the observation that logical consistency merely demands that a reason be given that justifies the change in
treatment. Pp. 89-90. The second argument addressed is the familiar one that justice requires
that like cases be treated alike. The problem with this argument, according to Bendit!, is that
disparate treatment of similar cases means only that one of the parties is being treated unfairly the party whose case is decided wrongly, who can be the litigant in either the first or second case.
P. 90. Third, following precedent promotes stability and certainty in the legal system. While
acknowledging the value of stability, Benditt warns that "(t]he law cannot become entirely
static"; flexibility is needed to meet inevitable social change. P. 91. The fourth argument for
stare decisis applies when the prior decision was reached by "a more or less arbitrary drawing of
lines for future reference." P. 92 (quoting Lyons, Formal Justice, Moral Commitment, and Judi·
cial Precedent, 1984 J. PHIL. 580, 585). The argument for following precedent in such cases is
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that a rule of precedent evolves just like ordinary substantive rules of
law: through "repeated, reinforcing judicial decisions" establishing a
rule of, in this case, following past decisions (p. 97). The argument, in
detail, runs as follows:
Suppose a rule of law favoring complainants in a given sort of case becomes established ... by a line of decisions in which each judge decides
that the best reasons favor following the prior decisions [independent of
the merits of each case]. Let us suppose further that in other sorts of
cases judges have regularly followed prior decisions, and that as an upshot various rules of law have been established. An important by-product of this process is that a legal rule of precedent is likely to become
established in the same way. It is easy to imagine it becoming both the
accepted and expected practice of and among judges to decide cases by
appeal to past decisions. Judges come to regard the following of prior
decisions as appropriate for themselves and for other judges, and to
think it wrong - legally wrong - to do otherwise. . . . [W]hen this
stage has been reached it is correct to say that a legal rule eX:ists. · [p. 97]

More important than the possible criticisms of this argument9 is its
strong positivist assumption: that judicial decisions, at least collectively and over time, make law. It is on this positivist assumption that
Benditt bases his theory of stare decisis. Yet Wesley-Smith argued in
the previous essay that positivism fails to support stare decisis.
Clearly, the authors' theses conflict - yet, because they pursue different topics and because they fail to address directly each other's arguments, the extent and seriousness of the conflict and whether and how
the conflict can be reconciled is left unclear.
The reader revisits horizontal stare decisis in Anthony Blackshield's ''Practical Reason" and "Conventional Wisdom·~· The House
of Lords and Precedent (pp. 107-54). Specifically, Blackshield examines how the House of Lords has historically dealt with its own precedents and the theories, new and old, of how to justify these
approaches. In the nineteenth-century case of London Street Tramways, Ltd. v. London County Council, 10 the House of Lords declared
itself absolutely bound by its own prior decisions. The House abanthat "the original decision constitutes a commitment, made to others, that future decisions in
similar cases shall be made similarly." Id. (emphasis in original). Benditt likes this approach
and thinks an analogous situation appears in cases where the previous decision is not arbitrary,
but where the disagreement in society is so sharp that it might seem arbitrary. As he puts it, "the
less the agreement on principles [in society], the more like an arbitrary commitment a judicial
decision will seem." P. 92. Benditt's support for following precedent thus seems to be based on
societal skepticism, namely "our (collective, though not individual) lack of certainty about the
correctness of certain of the social and political principles we adopt." P. 92.
9. One difficulty is that it assumes (incorrectly) that judges can determine that the best reasons favor following past decisions without knowing the alternative, le., the arguments that go to
the merits of the case. Yet if judges do consider the arguments that go to the merits and reject
them in favor of following the prior decisions, then they - to some extent - have decided on the
merits.
IO. 1898 App. Cas. 375.
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doned this approach in 1966 by declaring that, while normally it
would follow precedents, it would "depart from a previous decision
when it appeared right to do so." 11
One possible explanation for this history is that the House of
Lord's approach to its own precedents is "not itself a subject-matter
for precedent" (p. 110). By this view, the House's approach is considered a matter of "practice." Rules of practice are not the same as rules
of law, though they can "harden into law and create new rules of law
where no relevant rule existed before" (p. 110). In short, rules of practice appear to be law-like except that their application is, to some extent, subject to the discretion of judges. As Blackshield puts it,
"however firmly a 'practice' may seem to have hardened into 'law,' it
is always open to courts to affirm that it was after all only a 'practice,'
and thus to change it in circumstances where they would not be willing (or able) to change a rule of law" (p. 111; emphasis in original).
However, as Blackshield points out, explaining the House's approach
to precedent in this way does not fully account for the belief that prevailed during the London Street Tramways regime that the rule against
self-overruling was legally binding and thus not subject to judicial discretion. Blackshield also seems unconvinced by the notion of a court's
"inherent" power to regulate its own practice, though he fails to explain the theoretical basis of his objection.
Blackshield then considers explaining the House's approach to precedent in terms of a "constitutional convention." This differs from a
"practice" in that a constitutional convention must
have about it a quality of moral restraint, importing (i) that the effect of
the convention must somehow be to limit the exercise of power, and (ii)
that observance of the limits imposed must be perceived not merely in
terms of practical convenience, nor even of rational "principle," but as
some kind of moral obligation. 12

Although it may be easy to see the London Street Tramways rule as an
11. Lord Gardiner's announcement of the new practice reads:
Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which
to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some
degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as
a basis for orderly development of legal rules.
Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to
injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law.
They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears
right to do so.
In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the
basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been entered
into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law.
This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in this
House.
Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234, 1234.
12. P. 144 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). Just why a moral obligation cannot involve a rational principle is not explained.
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instrument of restraint, to view the Practice Statement rule that way
requires a change in perspective. Instead of describing it as allowing
departures from past precedent, Blackshield suggests that the Practice
Statement is simply a less strict version of the London Street Tramways rule: The House of Lords will use this newly proclaimed power
to overrule sparingly so that the judiciary will not usurp too much the
functions of the legislative branch of government. 13 The Practice
Statement can thus be seen not as granting power to overrule, but as
assuring that such power will be used within limits. As Blackshield
observes, "[t]hese limits and assurances are precisely the stuff that
constitutional convention is made of" (p. 144).
Since Blackshield defines a "constitutional CQnvention" in terms of
"moral restraint," 14 he must confront the fact that "[m]oral restraints
on power-wielders are not intended for the benefit of other powerwielders" (p. 146) but rather for the "public good." 15 Here, Blackshield is skeptical that either individual interests or the "public good"
have ever been promoted by the House's strict adherence to precedent
(p. 151). In the end, therefore, he views the attempt to conceptualize
the House's approach to precedent as a "constitutional convention" as
a theoretically unsound, though possibly convenient, "carpet" under
which we can sweep our worries concerning its juristic status (pp. 15354).
Like the previous two essays, Blackshield's is internally coherent.
The problem lies in relating it to the other essays, both those dealing
with the same general subject and the others in the book. As Benditt
does in his essay, Blackshield implicitly accepts a positivist view of law
in his discussions of "practice" and "convention." 16 Blackshield, unlike Benditt, does respond to Wesley-Smith's argument that a court
cannot bind its successors, 17 arguing that since it "depends on an inference from the nature of sovereign legislative power, this attempt to
extend it to judicial power is probably more 'ingenious than persuasive" (pp. 137-38; emphasis in original). Here, however, Blackshield
misses Wesley-Smith's point: that when the House overrules previous
decisions it is exercising legislative-like powers. Thus, his response is
insufficient. On the other hand, though Blackshield and Benditt both
13. See p. 144.
14. See supra text accompanying note 12.
15. P. 148. Blackshield recognizes the difficulty in determining just what the "public good"
refers to, but suggests that rather than responsiveness to public opinion, "the aspects of 'public
good' which have especial relevance and significance for judicial institutions may have to be
found elsewhere, for instance in the need for protection of individual freedom." P. 149.
16. For Benditt's support of positivism, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. Although
neither a "practice" nor a "constitutional convention" is "law,'' they both share with the law the
characteristic of being created by judges, as opposed to existing eternally as in the declaratory
theory. Pp. 110, 139-40; see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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presuppose positivism, they do not even address the same issues.
Hence, despite some tantalizing points at which the essays converge,
these points are too few and not significant enough to add a unifying
element to the essays.
It is even more difficult to relate these essays to the others dealing
with different general areas. For example, in Precedent, Induction,
and Ethical Generalization (pp. 183-216), Michael S. Moore attempts
to solve two problems of generalization he finds in law, science, and
ethics. The first problem concerns how to justify going from particular bits of evidence (e.g., past decisions, scientific data, or specific ethical judgments) to general rules. Moore's solution is, in short, to deny
any need to justify the principle of induction separately from the justification of the particular rules sought to be established (pp. 196-97).
To those who would object that the particular inductive arguments for
the particular rules ultimately rely on som"e other inductive arguments, which in tum must rely on some other inductive arguments,
and so forth, Moore responds that no starting point is necessary since
new beliefs are justified according to their coherence with old beliefs
(pp. 197-98). As for the second problem-which rule to generalize to
when more than one fits the data - Moore argues that one should
pick the rule that most coheres with other accepted beliefs (pp. 20609).
How Moore's arguments affect the theories in the three essays described above is not clear. What relation does Wesley-Smith's rejection of stare decisis have to the problem of induction? How does
Moore's theory affect Blackshield's analysis, which assumes that
"practice" and "convention" are both deliberately chosen and not
"discovered" through a process of generalization? Moore and Benditt
might seem to advocate similar theories 18 yet, as it turns out, the similarities are superficial. Benditt assumes that judges can generalize
from past decisions to form a rule of precedent, while Moore's whole
essay focuses on the very process of generalizing. So again, significant
debate on any single issue fails to materialize, and the reader is left
wondering why these essays are in the same; book.
The essays in Precedent in Law deal with numerous aspects of precedent, but the diversity of these works makes it difficult to relate one
piece to another. Thus it is unlikely that the scholar will find more
than a few of the essays useful. However, despite the lack of coherence among the contributions, Precedent in Law is still worth reading.
The essays themselves are generally very good: well-organized, interesting, and accessible to the general reader. While the works have a
18. Both argue that what seems to be a special problem is not really so special. Moore claims
that the process of induction needs no more justification than the particular rules sought to be
established; Benditt argues that the rule of precedent does not need to be established any differently than typical substantive rules of law.
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theoretical emphasis, they also provide appropriate support for their
theories. Precedent in Law's value is as an introduction to some of the
historical and contemporary thinking on precedent.
-

Erik G. Light

